[him] is back.

There is always a wordflurry when a new ICG report is released. This report reminds the [him] moderator that China in the September 2006 Security Council meeting denied that human rights and HIV should be discussed:

"During the debate, the Chinese permanent representative, Wang Guangya, argued that the Security Council was not the appropriate organ for consideration of “human rights questions, refugees, drugs and HIV/AIDS”. It would be “preposterous”, he claimed, to inscribe a country facing “similar issues … on the Council’s agenda”.

The ICG report executive summary is below. The formatting is not nice.

[him] moderator

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Asia Report No 144 31 January 2008
BURMA/MYANMAR: AFTER THE CRACKDOWN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The violent crushing of protests led by Buddhist monks in
Burma/Myanmar in late 2007 has caused even allies of the
military government to recognise that change is desperately
needed. China and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) have thrown their support behind the
efforts by the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy
to re-open talks on national reconciliation, while the U.S.
and others have stepped up their sanctions. But neither
incomplete punitive measures nor intermittent talks
are likely to bring about major reforms. Myanmar’s
neighbours and the West must press together for a
sustainable process of national reconciliation. This will
require a long-term effort by all who can make a difference,
combining robust diplomacy with serious efforts to address
the deep-seated structural obstacles to peace, democracy
and development.
The protests in August-September and, in particular, the
government crackdown have shaken up the political status
quo, the international community has been mobilised
to an unprecedented extent, and there are indications that
divergences of view have grown within the military. The
death toll is uncertain but appears to have been substantially
higher than the official figures, and the violence has
profoundly disrupted religious life across the country.
While extreme violence has been a daily occurrence
in ethnic minority populated areas in the border regions,
where governments have faced widespread armed rebellion
for more than half a century, the recent events struck at the
core of the state and have had serious reverberations within
the Burman majority society, as well as the regime itself,
which it will be difficult for the military leaders to ignore.
While these developments present important new
opportunities for change, they must be viewed against
the continuance of profound structural obstacles. The
balance of power is still heavily weighted in favour of
the army, whose top leaders continue to insist that only
a strongly centralised, military-led state can hold the
country together. There may be more hope that a new
generation of military leaders can disown the failures
of the past and seek new ways forward. But even if the
political will for reform improves, Myanmar will still
face immense challenges in overcoming the debilitating
legacy of decades of conflict, poverty and institutional
failure, which fuelled the recent crisis and could well
overwhelm future governments as well.
The immediate challenges are to create a more durable
negotiating process between government, opposition
and ethnic groups and help alleviate the economic and
humanitarian crisis that hampers reconciliation at all levels
of society. At the same time, longer-term efforts are
needed to encourage and support the emergence of a
broader, more inclusive and better organised political
society and to build the capacity of the state, civil society
and individual households alike to deal with the many
development challenges. To achieve these aims, all actors
who have the ability to influence the situation need to
become actively involved in working for change, and the
comparative advantages each has must be mobilised to
the fullest, with due respect for differences in national
perspectives and interests.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the International Community:
1. Agree to tightly structure engagement with Myanmar
with three complementary elements extending beyond
the Secretary-General’s current Group of Friends at the
UN and allowing for a division of labour and different
degrees of involvement with the military regime:
(a) the UN Secretary-General’s special adviser
and envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, who provides
a focal point for the overall coordination of
international efforts and focuses on national
reconciliation issues, including the nature
and sequencing of political reforms and
related human rights issues;
(b) cooperating closely with him, a small
regional working group, composed of China
and from ASEAN possibly Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, which
engages Myanmar directly in discussions
on issues bearing on regional stability and
development; and (c) a support group, composed of influential
Western governments, including Australia,
Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Japan,
Norway, the UK and the U.S., which keeps
human rights at the top of the international
agenda and structures inducements for
change, including sanctions and incentives,
as well as broader humanitarian and other
aid programs.
To the UN Secretary-General:
2. Strengthen his good offices by:
(a) becoming directly involved in key
negotiations with the Myanmar authorities,
including through a personal visit to
Naypyidaw in the near future;
(b) facilitating direct access to the Security
Council, as well as to the Human Rights
Council, for his special adviser and envoy,
Gambari, when he needs it;
(c) encouraging his special adviser and envoy
to focus on mediation between conflicting
parties and viewpoints and leave primarily
to the special rapporteur and other
representatives of relevant UN human rights
mechanisms the more public roles which
may weaken his ability to build relations
and confidence with all sides; and
(d) requesting sufficient resources from member
states to support his good offices in the
medium term, including for hiring necessary
support staff and establishing an office in
Myanmar or nearby.
To Regional Countries:
3. Provide unequivocal support for the good offices of
the UN Secretary-General and his efforts, personally
and through his special adviser and envoy, to move
Myanmar towards national reconciliation and
improvements in human rights.
4. Organise regional multiparty talks, including
Myanmar, China and key ASEAN countries, to
address issues of common concern, including by:
(a) establishing discussion on key peace and
conflict issues, including the consolidation and
broadening of existing ceasefire arrangements,
combating transnational crime and integrating
conflict-affected border areas into regional
economies in a more sustainable manner;
(b) creating a forum in which to prioritise
Myanmar’s development aims and how to
link them with those of the region at large,
possibly including a regional experts panel
on development and a regional humanitarian
mission;
(c) coordinating and strengthening regional
support for the relevant law enforcement,
development and capacity-building programs;
and
(d) ensuring that state and private business
practices serve the long-term interests of
the region by contributing to peace and
development in Myanmar.
To Western Countries (including Japan):
5. While allowing the UN and regional governments
to take the diplomatic lead, work to establish an
international environment conducive to their success,
including by:
(a) maintaining focus on key human rights issues
in all relevant forums, including the Security
Council, and by supporting active engagement
and access to Myanmar by the special
rapporteur and other representatives of the
relevant thematic human rights mechanisms;
(b) preparing and structuring a series of escalating
targeted sanctions, focusing on:
i. restrictions on access by military, state
and crony enterprises to international
banking services;
ii. limiting access of selected generals and
their immediate families to personal
business opportunities, health care,
shopping, and foreign education for
their children; as well as
iii. a universal arms embargo; and
(c) offering incentives for reform in order
to balance the threat and/or imposition of
sanctions and give the military leadership
positive motivation for change.
6. Organise a donors forum, which can work to:
(a) generate agreement on the nature and
funding of an incentive package;
(b) strengthen the humanitarian response by:
i. scaling up existing effective programs
in the health sector to ensure national
impact;
ii. initiating new and broader programs to
support basic education and incomegeneration;
iii. reaching internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and others caught in the conflict
zones, by combining programs from
inside the country and across the
border; and
iv. complementing aid delivery with
policy dialogue and protection
activities to ensure that harmful
policies and practices are alleviated;
(c) strengthen the basis for future reforms and
a successful transition to peace, democracy
and a market economy by:
i. empowering disenfranchised groups;
ii. alleviating political, ethnic, religious
and other divisions in communities,
and building social capital;
iii. strengthening technical and
administrative skills within state and
local administrations, as well as civil
society groups and private businesses;
iv. developing a peace economy in the
conflict-affected border regions which
can provide alternative livelihoods for
former combatants; and
v. strengthening the coping mechanisms
of individual households and
communities; and
(d) start contingency planning for transitional and
post-transitional programs to rebuild and
reform key political and economic institutions,
as well as social and physical infrastructure.
7. Invite the World Bank to initiate a comprehensive and
sustained policy dialogue with the government and
relevant political and civil society actors, including
needs assessments and capacity-building efforts.
8. Undertake a comprehensive review of existing and
proposed sanctions to assess their impact and revise
their terms as necessary to ensure that the harm done
to civilians is minimised, important complementary
policies are not unreasonably restricted, and they
can be lifted flexibly if there is appropriate progress.
Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels, 31 January 2008